The growing competition between the US and China for global mineral supply chains has made regions like Balochistan strategically vital. Control over critical minerals like lithium, copper, and rare earths underpins everything from electric vehicles to advanced weaponry. For the US, gaining access in Pakistan is not just economic but it’s part of a broader strategy to decouple from Chinese mineral dependence and try to reduce Chinese influence on Pakistan.

US President Donald Trump in search of ‘Critical Minerals’ to reduce dependency on China: Field Marshal Asim Munir’s offered President Trump to build a deep-water port at Pasni and a railway link into Pakistan’s mineral heartlands. Ties between Pakistan and the US have seen a drastic change in the last few months in the aftermath of the conflict with India ‘Op Sindoor’ following the Pahalgam terror attack. From signing cryptocurrency deals to crediting Trump for ending the conflict with India and proposing his name for the Nobel Peace Prize, Pakistani diplomacy has been in overdrive to curry favour with the White House.

The US delegation led by Eric Meyer (State Department) has expressed that Pakistan’s mineral sector is a “Core Interest” and has identified strategic cooperation in critical mineral resources as something US wants for its technology, energy, defense sectors.

Pakistan has since signed a memorandum of understanding worth US$500 million with Missouri‐based US Strategic Metals. The deal is with the Frontier Works Organisation (FWO) of Pakistan. The aim is to develop and process ‘Critical Minerals’ like copper, gold, rare earth elements, tungsten, antimony. This includes exploring, extracting, refining, and even processing valued products rather than just exporting raw ores.

The big Reko Diq Copper‐Gold mine in Balochistan is co‐owned by the Pakistani federal/provincial governments and Barrick Gold, and is expected to attract major international funding possibly from US institutions and generate large revenues. Production is expected to begin around 2028. These are long‐term projects.

The US involvement is viewed in some places as part of Pakistan trying to avoid overdependence on China I suppose as a cover up possibly US President Trump is trying to distance Pakistan from China through Field Marshal Asim Munir.

While the strategic partnership narrative has strong elements, there are many criticisms and risks. Critics say that deals are often opaque, and how much local communities (especially in Balochistan) or provincial governments benefit is always unclear. There’s concern that profits go to elites, and far less to those living near the mines, or whose land and resources continue to be exploited. The populace of Pakistan in general has been condemning the idea of “handing over” mineral resources to foreign companies.

Balochistan is resource rich but under‐developed. Many in Balochistan argue that though their province provides much of Pakistan’s mineral wealth, they see little return in infrastructure, employment, services, or political power. There is also grievance about environmental and social impacts.

The Saindak project (copper‐gold) has been under lease to Chinese firms, repeatedly renewed, but locals frequently complain about inadequate benefit.

Some fear that giving foreign firms long leases, or extremely favorable terms may amount to loss of control over resources that legally belong to provincial or federal governments.

Pakistan Military involvement like Frontier Works Organisation might further centralize control and reduce local oversight. There is concern that “security first” may trump local rights or environmental standards.

Balochistan has an ongoing insurgency and grievances (political, economic, cultural), moves to extract more resources can generate conflict unless accompanied by clear compensation, benefit sharing, and local consent.Also, infrastructure, law and order, environmental protection are weak, so mining operations can exacerbate environmental damage, displacement, etc.

I think the truth lies somewhere in between. Pragmatic diversification: After decades where China has been the dominant partner in infrastructure and minerals via CPEC, Islamabad seems to be opening up to US (and other) investment to reduce dependency and gain better bargaining power. I think the truth lies between Trump and Munir’s White House quite lunch.

Debt pressures and economic crisis: Pakistan’s financial situation needs immediate investment, foreign currency, and income — natural resources are one way to attract them. Some urgency could force less optimal contracts. Pakistan has publicly emphasized not just exporting raw ores but building processing, refining capacity, which if done well could capture more value inside Pakistan.

Facing external debt pressures, dwindling reserves, and IMF conditionalities, Pakistan’s leadership may perceive these deals as a short-term economic lifeline. Yet, without institutional reform, resource governance may reproduce past cycles of dependency and inequality.

The risk is that, under pressure, Pakistan may accept terms that favour foreign firms (or external powers) more than Pakistani provinces or local communities, particularly Balochistan.If legal oversight, environmental protections, benefit sharing are weak, then “Sell Out” is a real possibility — i.e. losing resource sovereignty or having the local population see little of the gains.

The US will likely get some access to critical mineral resources and possibly control over parts of supply chains (e.g. refining, exports).But it seems less likely that US (or any foreign firm) will, at least immediately, get full control or completely unfettered rights. Many deals are MoUs (memoranda of understanding) which are early stage, not full mining rights.

China’s Role and of Balochistan’s role is central to the supply of many minerals; thus control over what happens there (contract terms, local development, security) will be a key test. The province and its people are likely to resist purely extractive deals that leave them worse off.

Pakistan and its stake holders will demand as in the past to ensure the balance shifts toward a beneficial strategic partnership rather than a Sell-Out.

Balochistan’s political and social resistance around natural resource extraction has a long, complex history and understanding it is key to assessing whether the new US deals will stabilize or inflame tensions.

Saindak and Reko Diq as Symbols of Exploitation:

The Saindak copper-gold project (first leased to Chinese companies in the 1990s) became a flashpoint for accusations that foreign firms and the federal government were extracting wealth with minimal local return. The Reko Diq dispute — halted in 2011, revived in 2022 with Barrick Gold — sparked protests across Quetta, Turbat, and Gwadar over lack of consultation and environmental risks.

Movements like the Gwadar Haq Do Tehreek (Give Rights Movement) led by Maulana Hidayat ur Rehman have drawn thousands demanding employment, water, and end of heavy security controls.

Armed insurgent groups such as the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) frame their struggle around self-determination and resource sovereignty. Each wave of insurgency (1948, 1958, 1973, 2004-present) has been fuelled by central control over Balochistan’s gas, copper, and gold. Increased US or Chinese involvement without provincial inclusion may intensify nationalist sentiment and resistance.

Pakistan’s mineral wealth presents both an opportunity and a test. The renewed US engagement framed as a “strategic partnership” could indeed diversify Pakistan’s alliances and bring investment at a critical economic moment. Yet, unless resource governance becomes transparent, participatory, and environmentally responsible, it risks repeating a pattern of extractive dependency.

Balochistan’s people the custodians of these minerals must be seen not as a security problem but as partners in development. Without local consent, fair revenue-sharing, and visible benefits, any foreign deal whether with US or China will deepen alienation rather than unity.

National laws and oversight: ensuring mining laws, land laws, environmental regulations are robust, not overridden by foreign investment deals. However, with US Trump pressure all will be diluted to please Trump family Business Interests at the cost of the locals as has been the past practice.

Ultimately, the choice before Pakistan is not between the US and China, but between short-term political expediency and long-term sovereignty. True strategic strength will come not from who invests, but from how Pakistan manages its own resources, empowers its provinces, and safeguards the rights of its citizens or ends up in a Sell-Out.